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 1 
ALL THAT IS LIQUIDATED MELTS INTO AIR: FIVE META-
INTERPRETIVE ISSUES 
D. A. Jeremy Telman* 
ABSTRACT 
The promise of originalism is that it helps us to fix constitutional meaning and 
constrain constitutional decision-makers.  There are significant constitutional ques-
tions that originalism can help resolve, at least to the extent that constitutional deci-
sion-makers buy in to originalism. However, even assuming that originalism is nor-
matively desirable, there are certain issues that are fundamental to constitutional de-
cision-making but that originalism cannot help us resolve. The Framers were hope-
lessly divided on them, and they may not be susceptible to Madisonian “liquidation.”  
That is, at least some of these issues still generate live controversies even though 
they seem to have been resolved by adjudication, legislation or long-standing prac-
tice. 
This paper identifies five such issues, which seem the most fundamental.  These 
issues are “meta-interpretive” because they are subjects of interpretation while also 
providing the framework for resolving other interpretive issues.  That is, they estab-
lish the parameters within which constitutional decision-makers can resolve partic-
ular interpretive issues. Those who follow debates about and within originalist theory 
are familiar with the notion that original meaning sometimes runs out.  At that point, 
even originalists concede, constitutional decision-makers resort to modalities of con-
stitutional interpretation other than originalism.  My unique claim here is that origi-
nal meaning runs out very early in the process and that originalist interpretation 
therefore takes place within a non-originalist meta-interpretive frame. 
 _________________________  
 * Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School. For their contributions to my argument’s clarity, I 
thank Cynthia Rutz and participants in the Valparaiso University Writing Circle.  Josh Blackman, Julius Davis 
Mortenson, and Richard Primus provided valuable feedback.  Thanks to Karen Koelemeyer for her outstanding 
editorial assistance, even on very short notice.  
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I. Introduction: The Limits of Madisonian Liquidation 
All new laws . . . are considered as more or less obscure and equiv-
ocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series 
of particular discussions and adjudications. 
-James Madison1  
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man 
is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of 
life, and his relations with his kind. 
-Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels2 
Originalism has come to inform a great deal of our contemporary discussion of 
constitutional issues.  Even the non-originalist Justice Kagan has proclaimed that 
now “we are all originalists,”3 but as originalism becomes more widely accepted, the 
term’s meaning has become less clear.  In order to mitigate the vagueness of the 
 _________________________  
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Willmoore Kendall & George W. Carey, eds., 1966). 
 2. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 12 (English trans., International Pub-
lishers Co., 1948) (1848). 
 3. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (testimony of 
Elena Kagan). 
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term, I have adopted Larry Solum’s definition of originalism, comprising two com-
ponents.  First, the “fixation thesis” affirms that the meaning of each constitutional 
clause “is fixed at the time [it] is framed and ratified.”4  Second, the “constraint prin-
ciple” stands for the view that the meaning of the constitutional text should constrain 
those who interpret, implement, and enforce constitutional doctrine.5  That is, 
originalists seek to find the original meaning and, having found it, treat it as dispos-
itive of constitutional disputes.  Originalism in constitutional interpretation promises 
to fix constitutional meaning and constrain constitutional decision-makers.   
My focus here is on fixation. The Framers were hopelessly divided on what I am 
calling meta-interpretive issues.6  Madison believed that such issues could be “liqui-
dated.”7 He thought that, even if the constitutional text and ratification history did 
not resolve disputes as to the Constitution’s original meaning, such disputes could 
be resolved through adjudication, legislation or long-standing practice.8  However, 
as will be indicated below, some fundamental issues that seem to have been settled 
can arise anew. When such jurisprudential disruptions occur, they can be as seismic 
as a political revolution: all that once was liquidated now melts into air.  The very 
templates for constitutional interpretation no longer govern, undermining the bases 
for originalist interpretation.  
The issues that I discuss in this Article are “meta-interpretive” because they are 
subjects of interpretation while also providing the framework for resolving other in-
terpretive issues.  That is, they establish the parameters within which constitutional 
decision-makers can resolve particular interpretive issues. Those who follow debates 
about and within originalist theory are familiar with the notion that original meaning 
sometimes runs out.9  At that point, even originalists concede, constitutional deci-
 _________________________  
 4. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1941 [here-
inafter Solum, Unwritten Constitution].  The implications of Jonathan Gienapp’s work for the fixation thesis have 
not yet emerged.  Gienapp contends that the Framers did not think of the Constitution as fixing meaning in 1789, 
but that they came to do so over the course of the 1790s.  JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 10-11 (2018).  However, originalists who adhere to the fixation 
thesis can, consistent with Gienapp’s thesis, do so based on fidelity to how the Framers came to think of the Consti-
tution in the 1790s or based on normative theory untethered to the accidents of history.  
 5. Solum, Unwritten Constitution, supra note 4, at 1942.   
 6. See, generally, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 
1789–1801 (1997) [hereinafter CURRIE, CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS] (detailing constitutional controversies that 
occupied Congress in the early Republic); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, THE 
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888 3–58 (1985) (discussing the constitutional controversies that occupied the fed-
eral courts in the early Republic); GIENAPP, supra note 4 (reviewing the most important constitutional controversies 
from the Founding through 1796). 
 7. William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2019).  
 8. For the most recent, thorough treatment of the subject, see id. 
 9. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69 (2011) 
(acknowledging that the meaning of the Constitution sometimes runs out and that “[o]riginalism is not a theory of 
what to do when original meaning runs out”); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism at 19 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. 
of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research, Paper Ser. No. 07-24, 2008), available at https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 (observing that when the meaning of the constitutional text is 
underdetermined, original meaning “runs out” and must be supplemented with constitutional construction). 
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sion-makers resort to modalities of constitutional interpretation other than original-
ism.10  My unique claim here is that original meaning runs out very early in the pro-
cess and that originalist interpretation therefore takes place within a non-originalist, 
meta-interpretive frame. 
One might think that, with all of its variants,11 at least one version of originalism 
must be capable of resolving each of these issues.  However, because meta-theoreti-
cal issues arise outside of the originalist framework, no version of originalism can 
address them.  First-generation originalist intentionalism only highlights the contro-
versies, as is clear, for example, from the congressional debate over the national 
bank,12 the Pacificus-Helvedius debate,13 the debate over the Jay Treaty,14 and from 
numerous other controversies great and small that divided the Framers in the 1790s. 
As already noted, New Originalist textualism acknowledges that original meaning 
runs out.15  As I have explained elsewhere,16 more recent originalist innovations, 
such as John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s original methods originalism17 or 
Stephen Sachs’s original law originalism,18 also cannot resolve difficulties when dif-
ferent modalities of constitutional interpretation point in different directions.  Vari-
ous normative defenses of originalism, such as Randy Barnett’s libertarian variant19 
or Lee Strang’s Aristotelian strain,20 may resolve some issues for people who adhere 
to those normative perspectives, but I don’t know very many Aristotelians, and there 
 _________________________  
 10. See ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 98–99 (2018) [hereinafter SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH] 
(arguing that Solum’s two originalist principles play a very small role in the zone of construction and thus do not 
help judges decide hard constitutional questions). 
 11. One critic of originalism has identified 72 different theoretical strains within the originalist camp.  Mitch-
ell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009); see also Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of 
the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 719–20 (2011) (listing various strains within originalism, including original 
intent, original meaning, subjective and objective meaning, actual and hypothetical understanding, standards, and 
general principles, differing levels of generality, original expected application, original principles, interpretation, 
construction, normative and semantic originalism); James E. Fleming, Jack Balkin’s Constitutional Text and Prin-
ciple: The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL L. REV. 669, 670 (arguing that originalists are united only in 
their rejection of moral readings of the Constitution). 
 12. See CURRIE, CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 78–80 (describing disagreement over the 
constitutionality of a national bank between Madison, Jefferson, and Edmund Randolph on one side, and Hamilton 
and Fisher Ames on the other); GIENAPP, supra note 4, at 202–47 (recounting the congressional debate over the 
Bank). 
 13. THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING, at vii-viii (Morton J. Frisch, ed. 2007). 
 14. On the Jay Treaty, see GIENAPP, supra note 4, at 264–322 (highlighting the ways in which the debate 
over the treaty revealed ambiguities in the constitutional text). 
 15. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 9, at 70. 
 16. D. A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism and Second-Order Ipse Dixit Reasoning in Chisholm v. Georgia, 67 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Telman, Second-Order Ipse Dixit], manuscript available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3321916.  
 17. See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 116–
38 (2013) (defending a theory of constitutional interpretation tied to the methods of interpretation available at the 
time of the Framing).  
 18. See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 817, 874–
83 (2015) [hereinafter Sachs, Legal Change] (propounding a theory that constitutional interpreters ought to be bound 
by the original law as lawfully changed). 
 19. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 58 (Rev’d 
ed. 2014). 
 20. LEE J. STRANG, ORIGINALISM’S PROMISE: A NATURAL LAW ACCOUNT OF ORIGINALISM (forthcoming 
Cambridge University Press, 2019); see Lee J. Strang, Originalism’s Promise, and Its Limits – Symposium: History 
and Meaning of the Constitution, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 81, 87–91 (2014). 
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are plenty of people who will not be persuaded by libertarian arguments.21   There 
remains Jack Balkin’s living originalism,22 but Balkin’s project regards the Consti-
tution as providing but a framework in which contemporary actors work out the Con-
stitution’s meaning for us.23  It is therefore no criticism of Balkin to say that his 
approach will not resolve these meta-interpretive issues but only lay out the param-
eters for debate.   
This Article identifies five such issues.  First, is the Constitution best understood 
as the creation of a sovereign “We the People,” or is it a compact among sovereign 
States?  Second, is the enumeration of powers in Article I, § 8 a catalogue of all of 
Congress’s powers or merely a specification of some congressional powers which 
may be supplemented?  The third issue is a corollary to the second.  Does the scope 
of the Commerce Clause turn on the meaning of the word “commerce,” or should 
we favor a structural reading of the Constitution that would empower Congress to 
forge solutions to national problems that the States cannot (or will not) address? 
Fourth, what is the scope of executive power contemplated in Article II, and relat-
edly, did the Framers put Article I first in order to prioritize legislative power?  Fi-
nally, there is the question of the constitutionality and the scope of judicial review.  
Although nobody today questions the power of the federal judiciary to “say what the 
law is,”24 controversy remains over whether Marshall’s Marbury decision was con-
stitutionally warranted.  Moreover, the doctrine of constitutional review has meta-
morphosed into a concept of judicial supremacy that generates still further contro-
versy, although not, as of yet, at the Supreme Court. 
We tend not to acknowledge our uncertainties about these meta-interpretive is-
sues, but when we do, we recognize the instability of the interpretive ground on 
which we stand.  We then retreat, wisely, into the fiction that these meta-interpretive 
issues are resolved.  They are not. 
II. INTERPRETIVE MODALITIES 
Before I explore in further detail why these five issues are not likely targets for 
Madisonian liquidation, I should say a bit more about interpretive modalities and 
why they sometimes cannot be reconciled.  There have been numerous attempts at 
enumerating typologies of legal reasoning.25 In my reading of constitutional opin-
 _________________________  
 21. Indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport and Baude and Sachs offer their approaches to originalism as alterna-
tives to older, normative defenses of the originalist project.  See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 17, at 3–7 
(rejecting various normative defenses of originalism as inadequate); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law? 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2351 (2015) (observing that normative approaches are problematic because normative values 
are contested as are “empirical claims about whether those values are served and at what expense”); Sachs, Legal 
Change, supra note 18, at 826 (observing that non-originalists do not think originalism is normative but that the real 
problem with normative originalism is that just because something is good does not make it legally binding).  
 22. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]. 
 23. See id. at 10 (rejecting the original expected applications version of originalism). 
 24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 25. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–121 (1984) [here-
inafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE] (identifying six (different) modalities of constitutional interpretation); 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 44–69 (1980) (identifying six 
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ions, I see Justices engaged in nine well-recognized interpretive modalities: textual-
ism, intentionalism, structuralism, purposivism (or teleology), and appeals to prece-
dent, history, morals, logic, or common sense. Like Philip Bobbitt, I acknowledge 
that there may be additional modalities,26  but these seem to me to be the main ones.  
The Justices freely deploy whichever interpretive modality strikes them as fitting for 
the case.  They frequently combine interpretive modalities as all supporting the same 
outcome, but review of the briefs of the parties to the litigation, or the concurring or 
dissenting opinions, suggest that the modalities are often at odds.  
Disputes can arise within an interpretive modality.  That is, one may have textual 
arguments on both sides of a dispute, and such textual ambiguities may not be sus-
ceptible to Madisonian liquidation.  However, more often, when the issue cannot be 
resolved, it is because different modalities point towards different resolutions. 
What happens when different modalities lead to different conclusions, as they 
often do? For Bobbitt, conflicts among different modalities must be resolved by re-
course to individual moral sensibility or conscience,27 which are more likely to be 
stated than argued.  In some circumstances, arguments that arise in different modal-
ities may be incommensurable.  That is, if you are a textualist, my purposive argu-
ments will not persuade you, regardless of how well-grounded they are in research 
into the Weltanschauung of the Framers and the political theory of the late eighteenth 
century.  I, in turn, may shrug my shoulders with Gallic indifference to your textual 
arguments if I cannot reconcile your rendering of the text with my understanding of 
the Constitution’s general purposes.  In extreme cases, arguments that resonate with 
a person inclined toward one modality may not register at all with someone whose 
hierarchy of interpretations works differently.  Imagine, for example, how unpersua-
sive a living constitutionalist’s argument would be to a strict constructionist and vice 
versa.   
III. FIVE META-INTERPRETIVE ISSUES THAT ORIGINALISM CANNOT RESOLVE 
Originalism cannot help us resolve these five meta-interpretive issues because 
with respect to all of them, the following is true: 1) the constitutional text itself does 
not resolve the issues; 2) the issues either were not raised during the debates sur-
rounding the Constitution’s drafting and ratification or they were raised but remained 
unresolved; and 3) interpretive modalities lead to different resolutions of the issues, 
and the modalities cannot be reconciled. Some issues that satisfy these three criteria 
nonetheless have been resolved through Madisonian liquidation.  That is, although 
the issue was a live one at the time of the Founding, through deliberate constitutional 
 _________________________  
modes of non-originalist interpretation); Jack Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 641, 659–61 (2013) (identifying 11 “topics” (topoi or modalities) of constitutional argument); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 
(1987) (identifying five interpretive modalities). 
 26. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 25, at 8 (acknowledging that his list of modalities might 
not be complete and that it could be supplemented). 
 27. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 168 (1991) (contending that the Constitution 
relies “on the individual moral sensibility when the modalities of argument clash”). 
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reasoning, a course of practice evolved and has become settled.  For example, alt-
hough Madison and Hamilton disagreed about the scope of power to tax and spend 
for the general welfare,28  the Supreme Court decided in the 1930s in favor of Ham-
ilton’s broader construction of the clause,29 and that reading has not been questioned 
subsequently.   
Within the space limitations of this symposium issue, I can do little more than 
set out the terms of the debate over these meta-theoretical issues.  The full elabora-
tion of their contents could easily fill an entire volume. 
A. We the People Versus the States  
Does our federal government derive its sovereignty from the people or did the 
states delegate to the federal government aspects of their sovereign endowments? 
The Court first addressed issues of state sovereignty in Chisholm v. Georgia, in 
which a citizen of South Carolina sought to sue the State of Georgia in federal 
court,30 as seems to be permitted under Article III of the Constitution.31 
The members of the Chisholm Court had great claims to understanding the orig-
inal meaning of the Constitution and its position on state sovereignty. Justice Ire-
dell’s opinion is now regarded as vindicated with the passage of the Eleventh 
Amendment.32  He alone rejected the exercise of jurisdiction, but unlike some of his 
colleagues, he did not attend the Constitutional Convention;33 apparently for want of 
means rather than want of interest.34 In reaching his conclusion, Justice Iredell re-
jected two possible interpretations offered by Chisholm’s attorney, who happened to 
be Attorney General Edmund Randolph.35 Randolph not only attended the Constitu-
tional Convention, he introduced the Virginia Plan.36  Although he refused to sign 
the document at the end of the Constitutional Convention, Randolph changed his 
 _________________________  
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 29. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (noting that Justice Story sided with Hamilton and 
concluding that Justice Story’s reading of Congress’s power to tax for the general welfare was correct). 
 30. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for federal jurisdiction in “Controversies . . . between a State 
and Citizens of another State”). 
 32. But see John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. 
L. REV. 255, 261, 263 (1994) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment went well beyond Justice Iredell’s opinion, 
which limited itself to the subject of assumpsit). While Iredell’s opinion is sometimes described as a “dissent,” the 
Justices of the pre-Marshall Court delivered their opinions seriatim.  That is, each Justice wrote for himself.  There 
were no majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions, noted in Telman, Second-Order Ipse Dixit, supra note 16. 
Justice Iredell’s opinion is called a dissent because he alone rejected the exercise of jurisdiction over Chisholm’s 
claims. 
 33. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN 
JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 62 (1995) [hereinafter CASTO].  
 34. See Willis P. Whichard, James Iredell: Revolutionist, Constitutionalist, Jurist, in SERIATIM: THE 
SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 198, 206–07 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) (ascribing Iredell’s ab-
sence from the Convention to his “cursed poverty” but noting his influence on the North Carolina delegation through 
correspondence). 
 35. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 430 (“[A]fter the fullest consideration, I have been able to bestow on the subject, 
and the most respectful attention to the able argument of the Attorney-General, I am now decidedly of the opinion 
that no such action as this before the Court can legally be maintained.”) (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 36. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 20–22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
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mind37 and, as chair of the Virginia ratification convention, where some of the most 
storied debates took place,38 became one of the Constitution’s great advocates.39  
The other Justices, who agreed with Randolph’s view that the exercise of juris-
diction was proper, included John Jay, one of the authors of The Federalist Papers, 
and James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional Convention’s Committee of De-
tail40 and also a leader of Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention.41  Many scholars con-
sider Wilson “as crucial a member of the Constitutional Convention as any other, 
including James Madison.”42  Justice William Cushing served as Vice President of 
the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention.43  John Blair represented Virginia in the 
Constitutional Convention44 and was a staunch defender of a strong national govern-
ment at the Virginia Ratifying Convention.45 Prior to that, he had been an important 
legislator46 and jurist in Virginia47 before being among the first men whom George 
Washington nominated to the Supreme Court.48   
These Framers disagreed on the question of whether states were sovereign. At 
least two Justices rejected the notion that the United States derived its sovereignty in 
any way from the states.49  Justice Wilson was emphatic: “As to the purposes of the 
Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a sovereign State.”50  Chief Justice Jay emphasized 
what he called the “great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of 
this country.”51  It followed, in his view, that states would not be “degraded” in the 
slightest if their fellow sovereigns appeared in their courts.52  Iredell disagreed, 
adopting the view that the United States derived its sovereignty from the states and 
 _________________________  
 37. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 261 (2010) (de-
scribing Randolph as having “made his peace” with ratification as “the anchor of our political salvation” with amend-
ments to follow under Article V). 
 38. Id. at 257 (observing that Patrick Henry forced the Virginia Convention to “confront big questions . . . 
that had not been explored, certainly not with equal rhetorical flare, in any previous ratifying convention”).  
 39. Id. at 260 (describing Randolph as the “obvious person” to answer Patrick Henry’s criticisms of the 
Constitution); id. at 310 (quoting contemporary commentary that Randolph “amazed everyone” with his enthusiastic 
support for ratification). 
 40. William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 202 (2012). 
 41. MAIER, supra note 37, at 103–15 (describing Wilson’s role as the only member of the federal convention 
present and as the chief expounder and defender of the Constitution at the Pennsylvania convention). 
 42. Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1729, 1733 (2007) [hereinafter Barnett, The People or the State?]; see also Mark D. Hall, James Wilson: 
Democratic Theorist and Supreme Court Justice, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 
126, 129 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) (citing seven prominent scholars of the Founding era who rank Wilson 
just behind Madison as the most important figures at the Constitutional Convention). 
 43. See MAIER, supra note 37, at 193 (describing Cushing as vice president of the convention and a leading 
federalist). 
 44. See Wythe Holt, John Blair: “A Safe and Conscientious Judge”, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT 
BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 155-97 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998). 
 45. CASTO, supra note 33, at 59. 
 46. See Holt, supra note 44, at 162 (noting that, according to Madison’s records, Blair never spoke at the 
Convention).  
 47. See id. at 158–61. 
 48. CASTO, supra note 33, at 54. 
 49. See Barnett, The People or the State?, supra note 42 at 1732, 1734, 1746 (stressing the Chisholm Court’s 
rejection of state sovereignty and arguing that the Eleventh Amendment also did not embrace the expansion notion 
of state sovereignty associated with that Amendment today).  
 50. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 457 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 51. Id. at 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 52. Id. 
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that the states retained whatever sovereign powers were not delegated under the Con-
stitution to the federal government.53 
There are textual arguments on both sides, not that they played any role in 
Chisholm. The Preamble’s “We the People”54 suggests popular sovereignty, notwith-
standing the obvious fact that there was no “We the People of the United States” 
until the Constitution was ratified.55 However, the Preamble, to the extent that it says 
anything about sovereignty, is contradicted by Article VII. Article VII provides that 
nine states must ratify the Constitution in order for it to be established.56  Article VII 
twice invokes “states” and never mentions people at all.  The text thus seems to point 
in both directions, but I would give the clear dictates of Article VII the advantage 
over the Preamble’s incantatory invocation of the people. 
Article VII gains further support from the historical fact that the Constitution 
was in fact debated in and ratified by state conventions.57  John Marshall responded 
that those conventions were separate from state legislatures and were organized by 
state as a matter of convenience rather than out of principle.58 James Madison simi-
larly stressed that the Constitution was to be submitted “to the people themselves.”59  
However, Madison also acknowledged, as he must, that the Constitution would have 
to be carried into effect by nine states.60   In fact, the Federalists adopted a strategy 
of using state Conventions as a means of bypassing state legislatures that would 
likely have opposed the adoption of a new constitution to replace the Articles of 
Confederation.61   But Madison, Hamilton, and Jay knew to downplay this aspect of 
the Federalist gameplan in The Federalist Papers. 
Neither the textual nor the historical arguments in favor of popular sovereignty 
seem dispositive.  A purposive argument in favor of popular sovereignty seems to 
have trumped strong textual and historical arguments.  The Preamble’s reference to 
“a more perfect union”62 provides the slender textual hook on which we can hang a 
more robust, purposive interpretation.  Early case law stressed that the more perfect 
union was one that would exceed the weak Confederation under which the several 
 _________________________  
 53. Id. at 435 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justices Blair and Cushing restricted themselves to rather straightfor-
ward textual readings of Article III.  For them, whether or not states were sovereign, the Constitution clearly pro-
vided for federal jurisdiction over claims brought against them by U.S. citizens. See id. at 450–51 (opinion of Blair, 
J.) (rejecting the argument that states could be plaintiffs but not defendants in suits brought under Article III); id. at 
466 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (restricting himself to the construction of Article III).  
 54. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 55. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 49 
(2006) (“[T]he Constitution itself identifies its author as ‘We the People of the United States,’ which is clearly a 
legal fiction rather than an historical fact.”). 
 56. See U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the 
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”). 
 57. See generally MAIER, supra note 37. 
 58. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403 (1819) (contending that, although the people act in their 
states, their actions do not thereby become acts of the several states). 
 59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 204 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro, ed., 2009). 
 60. Id. at 202. 
 61. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 532–36 (1998) (citing 
numerous statements from leading Federalists on the need to appeal over the heads of state legislatures to the people 
in order to effect the constitutional changes that they hoped to achieve). 
 62. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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states hobbled through the 1780s.63  There is, however, no constitutional text that 
indicates that the more perfect union would entail either the reduction of state sov-
ereignty or the notion that the federal government’s powers derive from a sovereign 
people.  
The issue of the source of the federal government’s sovereign powers continu-
ally arises anew, in different guises throughout our constitutional history, and is 
never settled. Madison’s Virginia Resolution expressly took the position that the 
states were “parties to the constitutional ‘compact,’” and Kentucky’s Resolution pro-
claimed that states had the right to nullify any unauthorized federal acts.64  John C. 
Calhoun’s contract theory of federalism justified nullification of federal laws and 
secession from the Union.65  Even after the Civil War, adherents of the “Lost Cause” 
continued to proclaim that they fought not to defend slavery but for the constitutional 
principles of “federative” rather than “national” government.66  As evidenced by the 
Louisiana and Mississippi state sovereignty commissions, the ideology of state sov-
ereignty informed and energized Southern resistance to integration and civil rights 
legislation.67  
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland adopted an intermediate 
position, viewing Congress’s powers as emanating from state sovereignty68 but re-
garding executive authority as derived from the powers of the British Crown.69  Pop-
ular sovereignty played no role in his understanding of the Constitution. In 1995, 
Justice Thomas authored a bitter dissent on behalf of three others.70  He wrote that 
“[t]he ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of 
each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as 
a whole.” 71   That resistance to a sovereignty conferred on the United States by an 
undivided people of the United States still fuels the extraordinary expansion of state 
 _________________________  
 63. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 417 (1821) (“We would not expect to find in the Constitution 
a diminution of the powers of the government.”); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404–05 (allowing that the Confederation 
was a compact among states but denying that the Constitution entailed any recognition of state sovereignty); 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 463 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) (stating that the Constitution vested executive, 
legislative and judicial powers in the federal government). 
 64. CURRIE, CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 269. 
 65. See SAMUEL BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 224 (1993) 
(discussing the bases for Calhoun’s position in Montesquieu’s political theory). 
 66. See ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES; ITS 
CAUSES, CHARACTER, CONDUCT AND RESULTS 9–12 (1868–70) (rejecting the claim that those who defended the 
confederacy favored slavery and arguing the Civil War was a contest between forces representing opposed consti-
tutional principles). 
 67. See JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 60 (1994) (detail-
ing the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commissions’ espionage and surveillance work on individuals and groups 
promoting integration and civil rights); JENNY IRONS, RECONSTITUTING WHITENESS: THE MISSISSIPPI STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY COMMISSION 48 (2010) (highlighting the invocation by Sovereignty Commissions and similar bodies 
of the purported illegitimacy of federal encroachment on state sovereignty to draw attention away from white su-
premacist ideology). 
 68. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (treating the enumeration of 
congressional powers in Article I as a carve out “from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the 
states”). 
 69. See id. at 316–17 (arguing that sovereignty as to foreign affairs (“external sovereignty”) passed from the 
Crown not to the several colonies or states but to the United States upon the colonies’ separation from Great Britain). 
 70. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 846. 
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sovereignty under the Eleventh Amendment72 and the anti-commandeering doc-
trine,73 both products of the Rehnquist Court’s new federalism.74 
The tension between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty has not been re-
solved, and perhaps it need not be resolved.  However, we should realize that our 
current understanding of the sources of federal power does not correspond to the 
express opinions of at least some of the Framers.  That contradiction suggests that 
we should not presume to know the Constitution’s original design with respect to the 
relationship between the powers of the federal government and those of the states.  
B. Does Enumeration Matter?  
Our federal government is one of limited powers.  The enumeration of Con-
gress’s powers in Article I, § 8 provides the best textual evidence of that limitation.  
The Federalists saw no need for a Bill of Rights because Article I’s enumeration was 
supposed to set out the limitations of the powers of the federal government.75  In 
1941, the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Darby that the Tenth Amendment 
states but a truism that whatever is not delegated is reserved.76 The Supreme Court 
has never retreated from the position that the Tenth Amendment adds no limitation 
to federal power beyond that already apparent from the Article I enumeration.77   
But is that enumeration in fact a limitation?  Richard Primus has called into 
question our cozy assumption that the enumeration is and has always been under-
stood as a limitation on Congress’s powers.78 Primus points out that an enumeration 
 _________________________  
 72. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that “the powers delegated to Congress 
under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to private 
suits for damages in state courts.”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
630 (1999) (applying City of Boerne’s “congruent and proportional” test to suits seeking to vindicate rights created 
under Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and brought against states without their consent); 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (finding that the Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause 
does not provide a basis for jurisdiction in federal court against a state that does not consent to suit). 
 73. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902, 935 (1997) (finding that provisions of the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act impermissibly commandeered state and local law officers by requiring them to 
conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 
(1992) (finding that Congress lacks the power to compel states to provide for the disposal of low-level radioactive 
waste generated within their borders). 
 74. See, e.g., Susanna F. Fischer, Is Anything Obscene Anymore: Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Disa-
greement Among the Federal Circuits Over Whether Federal Law Criminalizing the Intrastate Possession of Child 
Pornography Violates the Commerce Clause, 10 NEXUS 99, 103–04 (2005) (describing new federalism as the move-
ment by five Supreme Court Justices who seek to uphold the principles of federalism underlying our system of dual 
federal and state sovereignty); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 643 (1996) 
(calling new federalism a “‘revolutionary states-rights movement within the court’”). 
 75. See Michael J. Klarman, The Founding Revisited, 125 HARV. L. REV. 544, 560 (2011) (reviewing 
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2010)) (noting arguments 
of Hamilton and others that the Constitution needed no bill of rights because the enumeration was an effective 
limitation on Congress’s powers).  
 76. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“The amendment states but a truism that all is retained 
which has not been surrendered.”). 
 77. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (affirming Darby’s statement that the Tenth 
Amendment “states but a truism”).  
 78. See Richard A. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 627–28 (2014) [hereinafter Pri-
mus, Limits of Enumeration]. 
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that does not express itself as a limitation is not an effective limitation, and the Fram-
ers knew that.79  He calls the enumeration as limitation theory “a talking point that 
most [Framers] dismissed as implausible.”80 Second, Primus points out that during 
the ratification debates, James Madison sometimes spoke of the constitutional enu-
meration of Congress’s powers as a limitation on its powers, but sometimes he ar-
gued that such an enumeration would not be an effective enumeration.81 Only during 
the debate over the bank in 1791 did Madison fully embrace the doctrine that enu-
meration operates as a fundamental principle, limiting Congress’s power.82 During 
the debate over the Constitution’s ratification, he had questioned the value of an 
enumeration as a tool of limitation.83  However, in the context of a debate over Con-
gress’s powers to establish a national bank, Madison now saw things differently.84  
This may seem like typical scholarship calling into question a well-established 
orthodoxy, and it is, but only in the best possible sense.  As Primus argues in another 
article, although we often invoke enumeration as a limitation on Congress’s power, 
courts mostly allow Congress to regulate just about anything they want to regulate.85 
As if reciting a catechism, courts rehearse the adage that ours is a government of 
enumerated powers, referencing the Article I enumeration as the textual evidence for 
the proposition, even as they permit Congress to regulate just about anything a state 
could regulate.86 John Marshall opened the door to such regulation when he opined 
that Congress has implied powers even without the Necessary and Proper Clause.87  
He placed that view beyond peradventure with his broad reading of “necessary” to 
encompass whatever was convenient.88  And yet, as Primus observes, enumeration 
still matters as what he calls a “continuity tender,” which he defines as “an inherited 
statement that members of a community repeat in order to affirm their connection to 
 _________________________  
 79. See id. at 614–15 (noting that, for most Framers, the most important mechanisms for constraining Con-
gress were neither external limits, such as a Bill of Rights, nor internal limits, such as an enumeration, but process 
limits, such as separation of powers and democratic accountability); Richard A. Primus, “The Essential Character-
istic”: Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415, 420 (2018)  
[hereinafter Primus, Essential Characteristic] (observing that “[a]t the [Constitutional] Convention, during the rati-
fication process, and into the 1790s, any number of well-informed Americans denied the enumeration principle, the 
internal-limits canon, or both.”). 
 80. Primus, Limits of Enumeration, supra note 78, at 614. 
 81. See Primus, Essential Characteristic, supra note 79, at 426–440 (detailing Madison’s views on enumer-
ated powers from 1785–88).   
 82. Id. at 422 (observing that the notion that Congress was limited to its enumerated powers was novel to 
Madison in 1791). 
 83. See id. at 422–23 (noting that Madison in 1787 saw no need to limit Congress’s power and did not think 
an enumeration would be an effective means for doing so). 
 84. See id. at 454–461 (elaborating Madison’s reasons for rejecting the Bank and his development of the 
argument about enumeration as limitation in that context). 
 85. See Richard A. Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2016) [hereinafter Primus, 
Why Enumeration Matters] (observing that the constitutional enumeration imposes virtually no meaningful con-
straints on Congress’s powers and it has not done so for some time). 
 86. See id. at 20–21 (noting that “Congress exercises something very close to a general legislative power” 
and “everyone knows it.”). 
 87. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 409–10 (1819) (“The government which has a right to do an 
act . . . must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means. . . .”); see also id. at 419 (repeating 
the argument and calling it “too apparent for controversy.”).  
 88. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413-14 
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the community’s history, even though they may no longer hold the values or face the 
circumstances that made the statement sensible for some of their predecessors.”89  
Primus’s work should cause us some cognitive dissonance.  We may accept, and 
pass on to our students, the received wisdom that the Article I enumeration matters 
in how constitutional adjudicators should construe Congress’s power. We remain 
conscious of the contrary reality that the enumeration, frequently invoked, does very 
little work in constitutional adjudication.  The disconnect between our continuity 
tender and our constitutional reality can give rise to phenomena beyond cognitive 
dissonance.  We may become cynical about constitutional truisms that have no con-
tent, or we may become dissatisfied with modes of constitutional discourse that do 
not accord with our political experience.  
C. “Commerce” or National Problems 
If enumeration matters, the Commerce Clause90 is one of the most important of 
Congress’s enumerated powers.  John Marshall determined that “commerce” means 
“intercourse.”91  While the Clause’s scope narrowed during the Lochner Era to ex-
clude manufacture, since 1937, the Clause’s scope has remained fairly broad.  How-
ever, many originalists think the courts have gotten it wrong, because they think that 
“commerce” in the eighteenth century meant “trade,” not “manufacture.”92  Congress 
could thus regulate railways and roads, but it could not regulate work conditions or 
work hours. As with the people versus the states, if we are going to privilege textu-
alist modalities, the stronger arguments support the narrow reading of the Commerce 
Clause.  But the analysis need not end with the text. 
Jack Balkin thinks that the courts that have construed the Commerce Clause 
broadly have gotten things right.93 He comes to a different conclusion because, in 
this instance at least, he favors a purposive approach over a textual approach for 
establishing the reach of the Commerce Clause.94   For him, the question is not “what 
does ‘commerce’ mean,” but “why did the Framers put the Commerce Clause in 
Article I, § 8.”95  His conclusion is that they did so to enable the federal government 
 _________________________  
 89. Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 85, at 5. 
 90. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power “to regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States”).  
 91. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824). 
 92. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. 
L. REV. 847, 856–62 (2003) (finding that the term “commerce” connoted only trade and exchange of goods when 
used in the Pennsylvania Gazette between 1728 and 1800); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Com-
merce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 114–16 (2001) (finding that the word “commerce” was used to mean only 
trade and exchange of goods in the records of the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates and the Feder-
alist Papers); Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, unpublished manuscript (forthcoming 
in U. PENN. L. REV (2018)), manuscript available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036206 (finding that the 
dominant meaning of commerce in the 18th century related to trade, not manufacturing). 
 93. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 22, at 140.  
 94. See id. (describing his approach to the Commerce Clause as “linked to the general structural purpose of 
Congress’s enumerated powers”). 
 95. See id. at 141. 
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to craft national solutions to national problems beyond the capacity or the will of the 
states.96    
The tension between the textualist approach and Balkin’s approach nicely illus-
trates the potential incommensurability of different interpretive modalities.  Textu-
alists are unmoved by Balkin’s evidence of the Framers’ overall intentions.  Balkin 
is unwilling to concede that the textualists are right about what “commerce” meant 
in the eighteenth century.97 However, regardless of the eighteenth-century meaning 
of “commerce,” Balkin embraces a broad application of the Commerce Clause today, 
not because Balkin is a living constitutionalist but because his originalism looks be-
yond the text to the principles embodied in the text.98 Unless one wants to adopt the 
stance that one mode of constitutional interpretation is superior to all others, original-
ism cannot resolve the tension between two modalities of originalist constitutional 
interpretation. 
D. The Scope of Article II 
The Framers were sharply divided on the scope of executive power. Our terse 
Article II provides little guidance as to the scope of executive power in matters great 
and small. For example, we now accept it as a given that the President, rather than 
Congress, has the power to appoint the heads of government departments.  The mat-
ter was not clear to the first Congress, which debated the topic heatedly in June 1789 
before resolving the matter by a vote of 31 to 19 in favor of the President’s appoint-
ment power.99  
Article I’s enumeration may or may not limit Congress’s legislative power.  Ar-
ticle II contains no analogous enumeration,100 and so, according to proponents of the 
Vesting Clause Thesis, Article II vests the President with all executive power, as 
understood at the time of the Framing, except for such powers delegated to Congress 
in Article I.101 Proponents of the Vesting Clause Thesis now claim extensive implied 
executive powers despite Justice Jackson’s reminder, in the Steel Seizure cases, that 
there is an enumeration in Article II and that the powers vested in the President are 
 _________________________  
 96. See id. (arguing that Congress’s Commerce Clause powers were designed “to give Congress power to 
legislate in all cases where states are separately incompetent or where the interests of the nation might be undermined 
by unilateral or conflicting state action”). 
 97. See id. (faulting modern originalists for ignoring the broader, social implications of “commerce” as “in-
tercourse”). 
 98. See id. at 1 (describing his “text and principle” approach to constitutional interpretation and construction). 
 99. GEORGE J. LANKEVICH, THE FEDERAL COURT, 1787–1801 18 (1995). 
 100. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President”). 
 101. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
YALE L.J. 541, 578 (1994) (arguing that the President has the powers and privileges of an 18th century British 
monarch, except those powers expressly delegated to Congress); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian 
Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 41 (“[T]he ‘executive Power’ also includes foreign affairs powers that are 
not otherwise allocated to specific institutions by the Constitution”); Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Basis of the 
President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 149–50 (2006) (contending that the 18th 
century notion of “executive power” entailed control over foreign affairs); John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and 
the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1309 (2002) (claiming that Article II’s Vesting Clause creates 
a presumption in favor of presidential authority in matters relating to foreign affairs). 
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actually quite modest.102  Rejecting the Solicitor General’s reliance on the Vesting 
Clause Thesis, Justice Jackson dryly noted, “[I]t is difficult to see why the forefathers 
bothered to add several specific items, including some trifling ones.”103    
Drawing on the Vesting Clause thesis, Sai Prakash has recently argued that the 
Presidency was imperial from the beginning.104 Julian Davis Mortenson contends 
that the Vesting Clause Thesis is demonstrably wrong because “the first sentence of 
Article II simply cannot bear the weight of the Vesting Clause thesis.”105  This seems 
like a traditional battle within originalism in which various interpretive modalities 
can be trotted out.  In such battles, we can work towards a resolution. Nevertheless, 
some originalists have given up on the matter and argued that originalism ought not 
to apply to executive power.106 
However, there is a missing piece of information that the originalist literature 
does not address.  If Prakash is right about vast executive powers being a part of the 
U.S. Constitution from the start, why did the Framers put Article I, enumerating con-
gressional powers, first?  Why not start with the President, if the President wields 
vast executive powers? The question is not rhetorical.  It may have been an eight-
eenth-century constitutional tradition that one starts with the legislative branch.  
However, it also may have been that the Framers thought that the directly-elected 
representatives have the closest proximity to the sovereign people and so the alloca-
tion of powers from the sovereign-governed to the governors should begin there.  
Finally, it may be that the Framers listed legislative powers first because they in-
tended to vest the people’s representatives in Congress with the vast majority of fed-
eral powers.   
The Constitution itself provides no answer, and, as Prakash and Mortensen’s 
competing renditions of the scope of executive power suggest, legislative history 
also does not resolve the matter.  Thus far, Mortensen claims only to have disproved 
the Vesting Clause Thesis. He does not claim that there could be no basis in other 
parts of Article II for expansive executive powers.107  In any case, the allocation of 
powers between the executive and the legislature has not been liquidated through 
adjudication or practice.   
E. Judicial Review and Supremacy 
My last meta-interpretive issue is the scope and finality of judicial review.  These 
meta-interpretive issues often arise in the context of constitutional interpretation.  
John Marshall established that “it is emphatically the province and the duty of the 
 _________________________  
 102. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 103. Id. at 640–41. 
 104. See SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 2–3 (2015). 
 105. Julian David Mortensen, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, unpublished man-
uscript on file with the author, at 5. 
 106. See Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Originalism?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 353, 356–59 (2008) (providing 
reasons for why originalism ought not to apply to the executive branch).  
 107. Mortensen, supra note 105, at 97–8. 
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judicial department to say what the law is.”108 Rightly or wrongly, that opinion 
achieved Madisonian liquidation.  But the scope and status of judicial review resists 
liquidation.  As Eric Segall has emphasized, both early originalists and the Framers 
seemed to call for a great deal of deference to legislative enactments.109  Alexander 
Hamilton called for judicial intervention only “if there should happen to be an irrec-
oncilable variance between” a statute and the Constitution.110  The originalist move-
ment began as a response to the perceived excesses of the Warren and Burger Courts, 
which first-generation originalists viewed as inadequately deferential to the people’s 
elected representatives.111  They too called for deference to legislatures, but since the 
1980s, originalists have been less clear about the parameters of judicial review.112 
There is a second way in which the scope of judicial review evades liquidation. 
Today, we assume judicial supremacy as a cornerstone of our doctrine of separation 
of powers.  However, the Supreme Court did not really embrace the doctrine of ju-
dicial supremacy until 1958 in Cooper v. Aaron.113  Josh Blackman has recently ar-
gued114  that the modern notion of judicial supremacy entails two doctrines.  Judicial 
supremacy means that the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional 
meaning.115   Judicial universality means that when the Supreme Court decides one 
case, its ruling applies to all potential litigants.116 Blackman rejects both of these 
doctrines.117 
In at least one respect, Blackman’s scholarship is similar to Primus’s.  Both seek 
to undercut firmly established doctrines.  Both can support their revisionist approach 
with a reading of our constitutional history. Southern governors who saw no reason 
to comply with the Court’s desegregation decisions could point to the example of 
Abraham Lincoln, who did not think the Court’s Dred Scott decision was binding on 
the U.S. government.118  Justice Brennan’s one-way ratchet permitted Congress to 
determine what the Fourteenth Amendment required.119  Presidents routinely deter-
mine which laws are to be faithfully executed, and immunity doctrines and the po-
litical question doctrine place their decisions beyond judicial reach.  In short, despite 
the received wisdom that the Supreme Court is the ultimate and universal arbiter of 
 _________________________  
 108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 109. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH, supra note 10, at 15–30. 
 110. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (McLean’s ed., 1788).  
 111. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH, supra note 10, at 6. 
 112. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 11, at 714–15 (noting that the “new originalism” has abandoned the emphasis 
on judicial constraint that inspired its original popularity); Eric J Segall, The Constitution According to Justices 
Scalia and Thomas: Alive and Kickin’, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1663, 1663 (2014) (discussing recent constitutional 
decisions in which Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted to overturn precedent or struck down legislation); Geof-
frey Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1548 
(2008) (noting that originalism can be “passivist” or “activist” and criticizing the Roberts Court for ignoring prece-
dent). 
 113. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958). 
 114. Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myths of Cooper v. Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), manu-
script available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142846. 
 115. Id., manuscript at 3. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id., manuscript at 3–4. 
 118. Id., manuscript at 4. 
 119. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656–47, 648 (1966) (holding that Congress can, pursuant to 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, determine by statute that certain practices are unconstitutional, even if 
the Supreme Court has previously found those practices to be constitutionally permissible). 
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constitutional meaning, political bodies often ignore the Court’s dictates or find ways 
to evade having the constitutionality of their decisions reviewed. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUED ROLE OF ORIGINALISM 
Although I expect that people who view themselves as originalists will resist my 
assessment that originalism cannot resolve meta-interpretive issues, my analysis 
changes little about the practice of constitutional interpretation. We will, because we 
must, continue to treat these meta-interpretive issues as settled. If we do not do so, 
we have no interpretive ground on which to stand.  Originalist interpretive ap-
proaches remain relevant, both as debates about meta-interpretive issues arise and 
for addressing ordinary interpretive puzzles within the parameters established by the 
fiction that these meta-interpretive issues have been resolved.  But they have not 
been resolved, and their resolution eludes originalist modes of inquiry.  Originalist 
interpretation takes place within a meta-interpretive frame beyond originalism’s 
reach. 
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